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SOME NOTES ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
INTERACTION AND MEASUREMENT[DRAFT]
DAVIDE BONDONI
Abstract. In this paper I present some reasons to adopt an holistic point
of wiev, eliminating a boundary subject/object in the measurement. I review
shortly Everett’s and Cramer’s positions, casting light on their flaws, to intro-
duce a logical motivation to thinking to an experiment as a totality in which
everything is entangled.
1. Everett
The idea to consider as starting point a totality is not new, neither in the field of
Quantum Physics. I could make the name of Bohr, but after him, it was supported
by Everett and Cramer. For many reasons, however, they failed to appreciate their
own intuitions. For example, Everett introduces a relativistic theory to eliminate
the concept of external reality:
. . . every system that is subject to external observation can be
regarded as part of a larger isolated system.1
But in such a larger isolated system,
There is no place to stand outside the system to observe it. There
is nothing outside it to produce transitions from one state to
another.2
This way, Everett denies the existence of a boundary (shifty or not) between ob-
server and observable. There is a system (a totality) in which everything happens.
There is no action from an observer (subject) towards an observed system (object).
Date: June 6 2010.
1[III57, p. 455]. The embolding is mine. In this context it is useful remember John von
Neumann which distinguishes two type of operations [Eingriffen] on Quantum Systems or on
manifolds of Quantum Systems: Wir haben also zwei grundverschiedene Arten von Eingriffen, die
an einem System S oder einer Gesamtheit [S1, . . . , SN ] vorgenommen verden können. Erstens die
willkürlichen Veränderungen durch Messungen (. . . ) Zweitens die automatische Veränderungen
durch den Zeitablauf (. . . )[vN32, p. 186]. We therefore have two fundamentally different
types of interventions wich can occur in a system S or in an ensemble [S1, . . . , SN ].
First, the arbitrary changes by measurements (...) Second, the automatic changes
which occur with passage of time[WZ83, p. 553]. The effort of Everett is to subsume the first
type of intervention in the second time, avoiding the problematic concept of something external
to the observed system.
2[III57, Ivi.]. The embolding is mine. In this passage, Everett is questioning the necessity
of an external observation to collapse a wave-function. Given a system S, Cramer confounds
the necessity to have another system S′ with which S interact, with the problem of the observer-
measurer. The wave-function collapses with a simple interaction. [Oza03, p. 117]. On the contrary,
the measurement is in a meta-level as regards the interaction. See my [Bon10c]. The observer
cannot collapse directly the wave-function, by only arraging the experiment in which such collapse
happens.
1
2 DAVIDE BONDONI
There is an interaction. Inside it and only inside it we can speak of observer and
observable. In this sense, the interaction is prior at least ontologically to the dis-
crasy between subjective and objective side.
We are in perfect agreement with Everett on this point. But, some pages after, he
ruines his theory, contraddicting himself. There is no boundary in our world (in
the phenomenon of our world) but between our world and others worlds. With the
collapsing, the system is in an eigen-state, say, |ϕi〉; but the original wave-function
was a sum of more states. What about them? With the collapse, our world splits
itself in many worlds, one for every possible eigen-state belonging to the primi-
tive wave-function. In our world, the observable is in an eigen-state |ϕi〉, in other
worlds, is in an eigen-state |ϕj〉, in anoter |ϕk〉, etc. The wave-collapse is so at the
origin of a branching, every branch standing for an alternative world:
(. . . ) there is no single unique state of the observer (. . . ) there
is a representation in terms of a superposition, each element of
which contains a definite observer state and a corresponding system
state. Thus with each succeeding observation (or interaction), the
observer state “branches” into a number of different states. Each
branch represents a different outcome of the measurement and the
corresponding eigenstate for the object-system state. All branches
exists simultaneously in the superposition after any given sequence
of observation.3
So, according to Everett, the superposition of states in the wave-function has as
a consequence a superposition of eigen-states, each living in its world. And any
inhabitant of a world is unaware or the existence of the other worlds:
(. . . ) no observer will ever be aware of any “splitting” process.4
This means that Everett’s effort to eliminate the boundary and the presence of an
external reality fails. There is no more a boundary in a single world, but there
are many boundaries between the many worlds belonging to the different branches.
Yet, it is difficult to grasp the meaning of something external to the subject, now it
is required to think to something external to an entire world. I think that Everett
simply moves the boundary observer/observable from one place to another.
Despite, his interesting starting point, Everett’s theory ends to re-introduce the
concept of external reality in another place of the theory.
2. Cramer
John G. Cramer starts willing to vindicate the Copenaghen Interpretation referring
to Everett’s theory of many worlds.5 In Cramer’s theory, we have an emitter and
an absorber. The first send a wave to the absorber; this answers with an echo-wave.
From the matching of retarded waves (from the emitter) and advanced waves (from
the absorber) it arises the quantum event. The event has its source in the interplay
of emitter and absorber. Therefore, we cannot say that the transaction starts from
the emitter to arrive at the absorber. But it is transaction to definy its point of
departure and the its point of arrival. No causal arrow.
3[III57, p. 459]. The italic is Everett’s.
4[III57, p. 460].
5Cramer doesn’t approve the branching originating the wave-collapse of Everett’s theory, but
he is a supporter of a relational way aiming, as in Everett, at to renonce to the reference to
something external to the subject.
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Nevertheless, Cramer in a way or another is compelled to explain the direction of
the transaction. He adfirms that is arrow-less, but then, how describing the flow of
a process? There is no causal arrow, but a time-arrow:6
(. . . ) in the transaction model the emitter is given a privileged
role because it is the echo received by the emitter, rather than that
received by the absorber, which precipitates the transaction. Thus
the past [where the emitter lays] determines the future [where the
absorber lays] (. . . ) rather than the future determining the past.7
In other words, first we have subject (emitter) and object (absorber), then the
relation (the transaction) between them. Cramer like Everett, ends to contradict
the core of his theory. The theory was born to eliminate a division in the exper-
iment in two contigous sides, but at the end it restablishes this boundary under
a diverse fashion. In fact, Cramer could make another step and assign to the
transaction a founding role. On the contrary, in Cramer transaction and difference
emitter/absorber live side by side, without deducing this difference from the total-
ity of the transaction. This cannot, perhaps, be accomplished with purely physical
tools, but it is possilbe in philosophical terms.
It is the accuse which Hegel move to the address of Schelling. For Schelling we
have an absolute on one side, an a molteplicity on the other side. How can this
molteplicity be deduced from the absolute? In Schelling there is no deduction at
all. It as almost a postulate. But, then, how can his absolute be a real ab-solute?8
For Hegel, the molteplicity of the reality must be deduced from the absolute, from
its internal articolation. There is nothing beyond it.
The fact that we, empirical observer, make experience only of a splitted world
doesn’t conflict with a primitive holistic reality. In fact, it is the event, founding us
as observers, which introduces an arrow from the subject to the object. But prior
to the event, there is nothing apart a situation in which all is entangled.
3. Model Theory
This state of affairs, according to which, we are entangled in a totality defining our
rôle is not so strange at it can appears at first sight. I think to Model Theory, for
example. Let use state a formula, say,
(1) < x, y >∈ R
(1) is true or false? A priori, neither true nor false. We must know what this
formula means. For example, it exists a model M in which x refers to Alice, y to
Bob, R to the set {< x, y > | x loves y} and in M it is true that Alice loves Bob.
I.e.
(2) M < a, b >∈ L
Where a refers to Alice, b to Bob and L to the relation loving. Well, now we can
exhibit another model M′ such that in M′ x is mapped to 1, y to 3, and R to the
relation ≥; so, we have:
(3) M′ 2< 1, 3 >∈ ≥
6This facet is very puzzling, as Cramer denies a direction of the time.
7[Cra86, p. 669].
8Absolute derives from the Latin ab-solutus (ab-solveo), free-from. Now, how can be an abso-
lute in this sense be limited from something external to it?
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In other words, our formula (1) is true in the first model M and false in the second
M
′. Why? Because, it is the model to establish the meanings of x, y and R. In any
model there is a function-interpretation which maps variables and costants in the
domain of the model. But this means that the validity of a formula depends from
the structure of the model in which is interpreted. I.e. a formula has no meaning
in itself, but only in a totality which intepretates its constituents.
Pay attention to this fact. In our fist case, the model assign a particular meaning
to the relation R: the relation of loving. But making this, it introduces also an
arrow from Alice to Bob. It is in the nature of the relation having a relate and a
correlate. It is the relation to define which ordered couple belongs to it and which
not. And in the essence of relation ’loving’ there is the request that one is a lover
and one a loved. In our fist model, the interpretation of R is such that the role of
lover is assigned to Bob and the role of loved to Alice. But this amounts to say
that it is the relation loving to establish an arrow from the relate to the correlate.
Outside the relation loving Alice could be a correlate and Bob a relate. Or it could
happens that there is no arrow between them.
Furthermore, we have seen that only in a relation we can speak of arrow, and of
roles. But what defines the meaning of the relation? The model. In fact, in the first
case the model has established as meaning of R the relation loving; in the second
case the model has established as meaning of R, the relation being greater or equal
to. So we can speak of truth, falsity and meaning in general only inside a model,
which represent in a mathematical fashion the concept of context, event, situation,
etc.
For this reason, it is not absurd to put the totality as the background, the apriori
which found the elements belonging to it. In the case of Model Theory it is this
just the case. Obviously, in reality we have no a unique situation or event. Exactly,
as we have not only one model, but many.9
4. Quantum Events
For this reason, I have used a model-theoretic symbolism to illustrate a wave-
collapse in my [Bon10c]. For two reasons: first, the collapse can occur only inside
an event, a larger structure, an experiment which constitues its a-priori, which
found it. Second, the value of an observable refers always to an eigen-state, a sort
of model-structure in which an observable has a meaning. Perhaps, it would be not
too absurd to describe an eigen-state this way:
(4) |ϕi〉 =< R,mi >
I.e. |ϕi〉 is seen as the ordered couple built up from a domain (the real numbers)
and a function interpretation mi which assign a meaning to the observables (the
hermitian operators associated to them).
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